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JUDGING JUDGES: WHY STRICT SCRUTINY
RESOLVES THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER
JUDICIAL SPEECH RESTRICTIONS
Ashna Zaheer*
INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2002 the Supreme Court, in Republican Party of Minne-
sota v. White', struck down as unconstitutional a provision of Minne-
sota's judicial code that prohibited judicial candidates from
announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues.2 In a
five-four opinion, the majority reviewed the speech restriction under
strict scrutiny and held that the regulation was not narrowly tailored
to meet a compelling state interest, therefore violating judicial candi-
dates' First Amendment rights.3
Judicial election has been a longstanding feature of the majority
of states' judicial selection.4 Currently, forty states have some form of
judicial election system.5 Further, regulation of judicial candidates'
speech during elections is not uncommon. Traditionally, the judici-
ary has been regarded as the "guarantor of individual rights,"6 "dedi-
cated to 'inflexible and uniform adherence' to the 'fundamental law'
of the Constitution."7 Inherent in the role of the judiciary is the
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2012; B.A., Vanderbilt
University, 2009. I would like to thank my family for their love and support.
1 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
2 See id. at 788.
3 See id. at 776-77.
4 See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: What are the
Alternatives?, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1327, 1327 (2008)
5 See Amt. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, Methods of Judicial Selection, http://wwwjudicial
selection.us/judicial selection/methods/selection-of-judges.cfm?state= (last visited
Oct. 10, 2011).
6 Tobin A. Sparling, Keeping up Appearances: The Constitutionality of the Model
Code of Judicial Conduct's Prohibition of Extrajudicial Speech Creating the Appearance of
Bias, 19 GEo.J. LEGAL ETHICS 441, 446 (2006) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexan-
der Hamilton).
7 Id. at 446 (footnote omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
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notion that judges must act impartially in applying the law, "putting
aside any preconceived notions, political agendas, social commit-
ments, and personal biases."8 However, the election process, and the
accompanying politicization, has posed threats to this idea. Accord-
ingly, the majority of states that elect their judges have adopted codes
of judicial conduct, which effectively regulate and restrict judicial
campaign speech in order to maintain the "independence, integrity
[and] impartiality" of its judiciary.9
The decision in White was especially notable because it was the
first time the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
states' restrictions on judicial campaign speech. Many of these provi-
sions regulating judicial speech had gone unchallenged for quite
some time, and were generally abided by until recent times. 0 In
invalidating Minnesota's "announce" clause, White made clear that
states would not be permitted to stifle judicial candidate speech at the
expense of First Amendment protections." Indeed, the Court sub-
jected Minnesota's speech restriction to strict scrutiny, the most inten-
sive type of judicial review.12 However, the decision also left many
issues unanswered. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion,
emphasized the fact that the holding applied to judicial candidates
rather than incumbent judges. Thus, he noted that the opinion left
open the possibility that public employee speech principles, which
allow for greater government regulation and less judicial scrutiny,
could be extended to sitting judges seeking reelection.' 4
8 Id. at 447.
9 Am. BAR Ass'N, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 49 (2007). The
American Bar Association (ABA) has developed the Model Code ofJudicial Conduct,
which prescribes rules prohibiting certain types of speech during judicial elections.
The majority of States that elect their judges have either adopted, or borrowed lan-
guage, from the ABA's Model Code. See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d
854, 880 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S.
765 (2002) ("Today, most states with an elected judiciary have campaign speech
restrictions patterned after either the 1972 or 1990 ABA model canons."); Julie Schu-
ering Schuetz, Judicial Campaign Speech Restrictions in Light of Republican Party of Min-
nesota v. White, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 295, 306 (2004).
10 See Robert M. O'Neil, The Canons in the Courts: Recent First Amendment Rulings,
35 IND. L. REV. 701, 701 (2002).
11 See generally White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding unconstitutional a provision of
Minnesota's judicial code that prohibited judicial candidate from announcing their
views on disputed legal and political issues).
12 Id. at 774.
13 Id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
14 Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Whether the rationale of Pickering v. Board of
Educ., and Connick v. Myers, could be extended to allow a general speech restriction
on sitting judges-regardless of whether they are campaigning-in order to promote
880o [VOL. 87:2
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After White, lower courts began considering the legality of other
provisions restricting judicial campaign speech. 15 However, the courts
have split on the appropriate level of scrutiny with which to review
judicial speech restrictions. Like the Supreme Court in White, the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits have rightly afforded judicial candidates'
speech the utmost protection under the First Amendment, and have
reviewed these restrictions under strict scrutiny.16 On the other hand,
the Seventh Circuit, acknowledging Justice Kennedy's concurrence,
has applied a lesser "balancing test" to uphold the validity of various
provisions, based on the faulty premise that judicial candidates are
public employees.' 7
This Note explores the constitutionality of restraints on judicial
election speech, specifically focusing on the appropriate level of scru-
tiny that courts should afford when reviewing the validity of such
restraints. Part I provides an overview of the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence with respect to both strict scrutiny and the balancing
test standard. Part II examines the White decision in its entirety. Part
the efficient administration of justice, is not an issue raised here.") (citations
omitted).
15 See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 2010) (alleging that Min-
nesota's "endorsement," "personal solicitation" and "solicitation for a political organi-
zation or candidate" clauses of the Minnesota Judicial Code were a violation of the
First Amendment); Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704, 707 (7th Cir. 2010) (challenging
the constitutionality of various provisions of the Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct,
which applied to judicial campaign speech, as unconstitutional); Siefert v. Alexander,
608 F.3d 974, 978-79 (7th Cir. 2010) (challenging the constitutionality of Wisconsin's
"party affiliation," "endorsement" and "solicitation" clauses); Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614
F.3d. 189, 194-95 (6th Cir. 2010) (challenging the constitutionality of Canon 5 of
Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct, which prohibits judges and judicial candidates
from (1) "identify[ing] [themselves] as a member of a political party in any form of
advertising, or when speaking to a gathering," (2) soliciting campaign funds, and (3)
"mak[ing] a statement that a reasonable person would perceive as committing the
judge or candidate to rule a certain way in a case, controversy, or issue likely to come
before the judge or court"); Weaver v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2002)
(challenging the constitutionality of Canon 7 of the Georgia Code of Judicial Con-
duct which (1) prohibited judges and judicial candidates from making negligent false
statements and misleading or deceptive true statements and (2) prohibited the judge
or judicial candidate from personally soliciting campaign funds).
16 See Wersal, 613 F.3d at 829 (reviewing state judicial canon under strict scrutiny);
Carey, 614 F.3d at 198 (using strict scrutiny to review the constitutionality of Ken-
tucky's judicial election canons).
17 Siefert, 608 F.3d at 987 (applying a balancing approach, rather than strict scru-
tiny to determine the constitutionality of Wisconsin's judicial speech restrictions on
endorsing partisan candidates and personally soliciting contributions); Bauer, 620
F.3d at 713 (reviewing the constitutionality of Indiana's Code of Judicial Conduct
under the balancing approach rather than strict scrutiny).
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III summarizes lower courts' application of White, and the circuit split
that has emerged regarding the appropriate standard of review for
judicial speech restraints. Part IV argues that restrictions on judicial
candidates' speech, like restrictions on all other political speech must
be reviewed under strict scrutiny. It will show that based on First
Amendment speech principles, as well as practical considerations, the
lesser balancing test is inapplicable to judicial campaign speech.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARDS OF SCRUTINY
Before turning to White and the circuit cases, and analyzing the
appropriate standard of review for restraints on judicial election
speech, it is necessary to briefly discuss the Supreme Court's First
Amendmentjurisprudence with respect to these different standards of
review.
A. Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny is the most intensive type of judicial review.18 Restric-
tions on speech reviewed under this standard are generally presumed
invalid, and the government has the heavy burden of proving the con-
stitutionality of the restriction.19 The Supreme Court has drawn a dis-
tinction between content-based speech regulations, which are at the
heart of First Amendment protection and subject to strict scrutiny,
and content-neutral restrictions, which are reviewed under a less rig-
orous standard.20 The general rule is that a restriction is deemed
"content-neutral" only if it is both viewpoint neutral1 and subject mat-
ter neutral. 22 Otherwise, the restriction will likely fall under the exact-
ing standard of strict scrutiny, only subject to certain categorical
exceptions, including incitement,23 defamation, 24 obscenity,25 and
child pornography. 26 Further, the Court has declared that political
18 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 541 (3d
ed. 2006).
19 See id. at 542.
20 See id. at 933.
21 The restriction is "viewpoint neutral" if it does not target speech based on the
"ideology of the message." Id. at 934 (citing Amy Sabrin, Thinking About Content: Can it
Play an Appropriate Role in Government Funding of the Arts?, 102 YALE L.J. 1209, 1220
(1993)).
22 The restriction is "subject matter neutral" if it does not target speech based on
its topic. Id.
23 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
24 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254-56 (1952).
25 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957).
26 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
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speech is at the core of the First Amendment, noting: "the First
Amendment 'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech
uttered during a campaign for political office."27 Accordingly, restric-
tions on political speech have repeatedly been subjected to strict
scrutiny.28
Although rare, a regulation can survive strict scrutiny if the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.29
To be narrowly tailored, a regulation must: (1) actually advance the
state's compelling interest, (2) not be overinclusive, in the sense that
it restricts speech that does not implicate the compelling interest, (3)
be the least restrictive alternative, and (4) not be underinclusive, in
the sense that it fails to restrict a significant amount of speech that
implicates the compelling governmental interest.30
B. Balancing Test
Although the general rule is that content-based speech restrictions
are subject to strict scrutiny, the Court has held that certain types of
speech are entitled to less protection under the First Amendment,
including that of public employees.31 Under this lower standard of
27 Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223 (1989) (quoting
Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
28 See CHEMEPJNSKY, supra note 18, at 1070.
29 See, e.g, Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 655 (1990)
(upholding the Michigan Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited corporations
from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candi-
dates in elections for state offices); Eu, 489 U.S. at 229 (holding that California's
Election's Code provision, which prohibits the official governing bodies of political
parties from endorsing candidates in party primaries, violates the free speech and
associational rights of political parties and their members guaranteed by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473
U.S. 788, 813 (1985) (holding that the government did not violate the First Amend-
ment by excluding legal-defense and political-advocacy organizations from participa-
tion in the Combined Federal Campaign, a charity drive directed at federal
employees); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177, 183-84 (1983) (holding that a
law prohibiting demonstrations on sidewalks around the U.S. Supreme Court build-
ing was unconstitutional because sidewalks are traditional public forums where peo-
ple have long expressed their views); Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92,
101-02 (1972) (holding a Chicago ordinance which prohibited picketing within 150
feet of a school with an exception for labor picketing unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause).
30 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoing and Transcending Strict
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 2417, 2421-23 (1996).
31 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384, 392 (1987) (holding that an
unpopular or extreme comment made on a matter of public interest and spoken by a
government employee with no policymaking function and a job with little public
2011] 883
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review, the Court balances the employee's right to free speech against
the government's interest in restricting the speech. This section
examines the seminal cases on public employee speech, including
those most pertinent to our discussion.
1. Pickering v. Board of Education32
In Pickering v. Board of Education, Pickering, a public high school
teacher, was fired after he sent a letter to a local newspaper criticizing
the school board's dispersion of funds, and informing taxpayers of the
real reasons why additional tax revenue was being sought.33 The
school board dismissed the teacher on the grounds that his "state-
ments unjustifiably impugned the 'motives, honesty, integrity, truth-
fulness, responsibility and competence' of both the Board and the
school administration[,]" and "damaged the professional reputations
of its members and of the school administrators."3 4
In determining whether the First Amendment protected Picker-
ing's speech, the Court reviewed the dismissal under a less rigorous
standard than that of strict scrutiny.35 Instead, the court acknowl-
edged that "the State has interests as an employer in regulating the
speech of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses
in connection with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in gen-
eral."3 6 Accordingly, the Court concluded that the appropriate stan-
dard in this case was to balance "the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the inter-
est of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."3 7
Even under the less intensive review, the Court held that the facts
of the case tipped the balance in favor of the teacher, such that the
First Amendment protected his speech. The Court noted that the
teacher's statements neither impeded his job performance nor inter-
interaction is protected by the First Amendment); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
140, 154 (1983) (holding that a government employee's questionnaire concerning
her superior's management practices is not protected speech under the First Amend-
ment because most of the matters the questionnaire concerned were of personal, not
public, concern); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 574 (1968) (holding
that a public school teacher has a right under the First Amendment to speak on issues
of public concern without being dismissed from his position).
32 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
33 See id. at 566.
34 Id. at 567.
35 Id. at 568.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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fered with the school's operation.38 Further, the Court emphasized
that the statements, which addressed the school's allocation of funds,
were a matter of "legitimate public concern."" Because teachers are
likely to have an informed opinion on how funds should be allocated,
the Court held that it was "essential that they be able to speak out
freely . .. without fear of retaliatory dismissal." 40 Therefore, the Court
concluded that the teacher's interests outweighed the state's, and the
school's regulation of his speech violated the First Amendment.4'
2. Connick v. Myers"2
In Connick v. Myers, the Court reinforced and refined the decision of
Pickering. The dispute in Connick arose after the plaintiff, an Assistant
District Attorney, was notified, that despite her objections, she was
being transferred to a different section of the criminal court.43
Angered by the decision, the plaintiff circulated a questionnaire solic-
iting the views of staff members and attorneys concerning the "office
transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee,
[and] the level of confidence in supervisors." 44 The plaintiff was
immediately fired for insubordination, and she sued claiming a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.45
Relying on the Pickering balancing test, the Court ruled against
the plaintiff.4 6 Specifically, the Court said that the plaintiffs question-
naire did not comment on matters of public concern, stressing that
"[t]he repeated emphasis in Pickering on the right of a public
employee 'as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern,'
was not accidental."47 Indeed, the Court stated, "[w]hen employee
expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of
political, social, or other concern to the community, government offi-
cials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without
intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amend-
ment."48 Further, the Court added an additional consideration to
38 See id. at 572-73.
39 Id. at 571.
40 Id. at 572.
41 See id. at 574-75.
42 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
43 See id. at 140.
44 Id. at 141.
45 See id.
46 See id. at 142.
47 Id. at 143 (emphasis added) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968)).
48 Id. at 146.
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their Pickering analysis, noting that the question of whether speech
addresses "a matter of public concern" should be "determined by the
[statement's] content, form, and context."49
3. U.S. Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter
Carriers50
In Letter Carriers, the Court considered the constitutionality of the
federal Hatch Act, which prohibited government employees from tak-
ing "an active part in political management and in political cam-
paigns."51 In upholding the Act, the Court turned to the Pickering
balancing test as the appropriate standard for review, and concluded
that the interests served by the limitations contained in the Hatch Act
weighed in the government's favor.5 2 Specifically, the Court identi-
fled that the government had a compelling interest in the impartial
execution of laws, noting that "partisan political activities by federal
employees must be limited if the Government is to operate effectively
and fairly."5 3 The Court also noted that preventing the appearance of
government employee partisanship furthered the government's inter-
est in maintaining confidence in the "system of representative
Government."54
II. REPUBLICAN PARTY OF MINNESOTA V. WHITE
A. Background
Since its inception, the Minnesota State Constitution has provided
that all state judges are to be selected by popular election.5 > In 1974,
the Minnesota Supreme Court developed a code of judicial conduct
based largely on the 1972 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.5 6
The judicial code has been revised over time and includes rules "relat-
ing to a candidate's ability to attend and speak at political gatherings,
to solicit campaign funds, and to discuss certain topics."57 The
Canons of the Minnesota Code implicated in this case applied both to
49 Id. at 147-48.
50 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
51 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324-7325 (2006). This law was substantially modified in 1993; see
5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1994).
52 Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 565.
53 Id. at 564.
54 Id. at 565.
55 See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd
sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
56 Id.
57 Id.
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judicial candidates and incumbent judges. "Incumbent judges who
violate it are subject to discipline, including removal, censure, civil
penalties, and suspension without pay."58 Attorneys who violate the
code "are subject to, inter alia, disbarment, suspension, and
probation."59
In 1996, Gregory Wersal was a candidate for associate justice of
the Minnesota Supreme Court.60 During the course of his campaign,
Wersal, along with members of his campaign committee, engaged in a
number of activities on Wersal's behalf including: (1) attending,
speaking, and distributing campaign literature at Republican party
gatherings; (2) announcing that Wersal was in favor of a strict con-
struction of the Constitution and was critical of certain Minnesota
Supreme Court decisions; (3) identifying Wersal as a member of the
Republican party; (4) seeking the Republican party's endorsement;
and (5) soliciting campaign contributions. 61 As a result of this con-
duct, a complaint with the Office of Professional Responsibility was
filed against Wersal, claiming that he had violated Canon 5 of the
Minnesota Judicial Code.62 The complaint was dismissed for various
reasons, including ambiguities in the Code.63 Nonetheless, Wersal
withdrew his candidacy, fearing that further complaints might jeop-
ardize his legal career.64
In 1998, Wersal once again ran for the same judicial office, and
sought an advisory opinion from the Office of Professional Responsi-
bility regarding its intentions in enforcing "the prohibitions against
judicial candidates [contained in Canon 5]: (1) speaking on their own
behalf to political party organization gatherings; (2) seeking,
accepting or using endorsements from a political party organization;
and (3) announcing his or her views on disputed legal issues."65 The
Office responded that it would enforce the first two prohibitions, but
refused to answer whether it would enforce the third, stating that
more specificity was needed on the types of statements he would be
58 White, 536 U.S. at 768 (citing Minn. Rules of Board on Judicial Standards
4(a)(6), 11(d) (2002)).
59 Id. (citing Minn. Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility 8-14, 15(a)
(2002)).
60 Id. at 768.
61 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d 967, 972 (D. Minn. 1999),
aff'd, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White,
536 U.S. 765 (2002).
62 See Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 972.
63 See id. at 972-73.
64 See id. at 973.
65 Id. at 973-74.
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making, and expressing doubt of the constitutionality of the third
prohibition.66
In response, Wersal, the Republican Party of Minnesota, and vari-
ous other individuals and organizations filed suit in the District Court
of Minnesota, challenging the constitutionality of various provisions of
Canon 5.67 In Count I, the plaintiffs alleged that prohibiting judicial
candidates and others, acting on their behalf, "from attending and
speaking at political gatherings" infringed on their First Amendment
right to freedom of speech and association, as well as the equal protec-
tion clause of the Constitution.68 Count II claimed that the
"announce clause," which banned judicial candidates from announc-
ing their views on disputed legal or political issues was a violation of
their right to freedom of speech.69 Count III asserted that prohibiting
judicial candidates from identifying their political party constituted an
infringement on their rights of freedom of speech, association and
equal protection.70 Count IV alleged that banning judicial candidates
from "seeking, accepting or using political party endorsements," also
violated their rights of freedom of speech, association, and equal pro-
tection.71 Finally, Count V claimed that restricting judicial candidates
from personally soliciting campaign contributions violated their right
to free speech. 72
B. District Court Opinion
The district court separately considered the constitutionality of the
political activity clause, personal solicitation clause, and announce
clause of Canon 5 (Counts I, II, and V respectively), under a strict
scrutiny analysis.73 The court held that each of these prohibitions
served a compelling state interest of "maintaining the actual and
apparent independence of the judiciary."74 Further, the court noted
that the "restrictions on judicial candidates' political activity and fund
solicitation were narrowly tailored to serve those interests."75 With
66 See id. at 974.
67 See id.
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See generally id. at 974-86 (evaluating Counts 1, 11 and V using a strict scrutiny
standard).
74 Id. at 977.
75 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'd sub
nom. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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respect to the announce clause, the court acknowledged that there
may be some constitutional difficulties with the clause as written
because, although it serves a compelling interest, it may not be nar-
rowly tailored.7 6 Specifically, the court noted that another court had
concluded that language identical to the announce clause violated the
First Amendment, "because the canon reached far beyond speech that
could reasonably be interpreted as committing a candidate in a way
which would compromise impartiality if such candidate succeeded in
the election."7 7 Nevertheless, the court decided that the clause could
be narrowly construed, so as to not violate the First Amendment, by
interpreting it "as only prohibiting discussion of a judicial candidate's
predisposition to issues likely to come before the court."7 8
C. Eighth Circuit Opinion
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court.79 Fur-
ther, the court explicitly rejected the defendant's suggestion that the
court look to Letter Carriers and other cases following it which reviewed
restrictions on government employees' speech under a balancing test
rather than strict scrutiny.80 Although the court acknowledged that
the balancing test could be applied to Wersal despite the fact that he
was not a government employee-"[t]he state c[ould] reasonably con-
clude that Wersal's actions as a candidate could affect his actions as a
judge if he [wa]s elected" 8 1-the court held that the type of restric-
tions present in this case were different than the Hatch Act provisions
challenged in Letter Carriers.82 Specifically, the court reasoned that
the Hatch Act restrained political activity of government employees,
[whereas] Canon 5 restrains the activity of candidates engaged in an
election contest . . . [and] the public's interest in free speech is
greater where the person subject to restrictions is a candidate for
public office, about whom the public is obliged to inform itself.8 3
Accordingly, the court held that the appropriate standard of review
was strict scrutiny.84
76 See Kelly, 63 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85.
77 Id. at 984 (citing Buckley v. Ill.Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 229 (7th Cir.
1993)).
78 Id. at 986.
79 See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 857.
80 See id. at 864 (citing U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973)).
81 Id. at 864 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976)).
82 See id. at 864.
83 Id.
84 See id.
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The Eighth Circuit found that the provisions of Canon 5 served
two "undeniably compelling"85 state interests: "[P]reserving the
impartiality of the state judiciary and preserving the appearance of the
impartiality of the state judiciary." 86 Like the district court, the Eighth
Circuit held that the political activities, personal solicitation, and
announce clauses of Canon 5 were narrowly tailored to meet these
state interests, thus surviving strict scrutiny.87 The court also empha-
sized that although the state has chosen to select its judges by popular
election, this decision could not be regarded "as an abandonment of a
State's interest in an independent judiciary,"88 and that "[judges
remain different from legislators and executive officials . . . in ways
that bear on the strength of the state's interest in restricting their free-
dom of speech."89
D. Supreme Court Opinion
On appeal, the Supreme Court only considered the constitutionality
of the announce clause. 90 In a five-four split, the Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit, declaring Minnesota's announce clause to be a viola-
tion of the First Amendment.9'
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, began by defin-
ing the scope of the announce clause, concluding that it would pro-
hibit a judicial candidate from stating his view "on any specific
nonfanciful legal question within the province of the court for which
he is running, except in the context of discussing past decisions-and
in the latter context as well, if he expresses the view that he is not
bound by stare decisis."92 The Court then proceeded to review the
clause under strict scrutiny, noting that the Eighth Circuit had also
determined that this was the proper test, and that neither party dis-
puted it.93
In determining whether preserving the actual and apparent
impartiality of the judiciary were indeed compelling state interests to
justify the announce clause, Justice Scalia stated it was necessary to
85 Id. ("There is simply no question but that a judge's ability to apply the law
neutrally is a compelling governmental interest of the highest order.").
86 Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775 (2002).
87 See Kelly, 247 F.3d at 872-85.
88 Id. at 867 (citing Buckley v. Ill. Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir.
1993)).
89 Id. at 862 (quoting Buckley, 997 F.2d at 228).
90 See White, 536 U.S. at 770.
91 See id. at 788.
92 Id. at 773.
93 See id. at 774.
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define the term "impartiality."9 4 He offered three meanings of the
term.95 First, he provided the "root meaning" of the term, and stated
that impartiality means "the lack of bias for or against either party to
the proceeding."96 In this sense, impartiality "assures equal applica-
tion of the law . .. [and] guarantees a party that the judge who hears
his case will apply the law to him in the same way he applies it to any
other party."9 7 The Court implied that under this definition the
announce clause served a compelling state interest, but failed strict
scrutiny nonetheless because it was "barely tailored to serve th[e]
interest at all," as it did not "restrict speech for or against particular
parties, but rather speech for or against particular issues."98
Second, Justice Scalia stated that "impartiality" could be defined
"to mean lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal
view."99 However, the Court noted that impartiality in this sense
would not serve a compelling state interest,100 because judges possess-
ing a "complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication
would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias." 01 Third,
Justice Scalia offered that "impartiality" may be defined as open-mind-
edness.10 2 Under this definition, ajudge may have preconceptions on
legal issues, but would be "willing to consider views that oppose his
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise
in a pending case."10 The Court left open whether this definition of
impartiality served compelling state interests, noting that it did not
"believe the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted the announce clause
for that purpose."104 Therefore, since the announce clause was not
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest under any defini-
tion of "impartiality," the Court held that the clause failed strict scru-
tiny, and was an unconstitutional infringement of free speech.
Finally, the majority concluded its opinion by discussing the
"obvious tension between the article of Minnesota's popularly
approved constitution which provides that judges shall be elected, and
the Minnesota Supreme Court's announce clause which places most
94 See id. at 775.
95 See id. at 775-79.
96 Id. at 775.
97 Id. 775-76.
98 Id. at 776.
99 Id. at 777.
100 See id.
101 Id. at 778.
102 See id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
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subjects of interest to the voters off limits." 0 5 Specifically, the Court
emphasized "' [d]ebate on the qualifications of candidates' is 'at the
core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms,'
not the edges,"106 and that the government has never been permitted
to restrict "candidates from communicating relevant information to
voters during an election."'07 Thus, the Court asserted that if a state
chooses to "tap the energy and the legitimizing power of the demo-
cratic process," by selecting judges through election, "it must accord
the participants in that process . . . the First Amendment rights that
attach to their roles." 08
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy bothjoined in the majority opin-
ion, but each wrote separate concurrences. Justice O'Connor
expressed her aversion to judicial elections, stating that the "very prac-
tice of electing judges" undermines any governmental interest in pre-
serving an impartial judiciary, because judges subject to reelection are
likely to "feel that they have at least some personal stake in the out-
come of every publicized case."109 Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor was
clear to assert that Minnesota had voluntarily assumed these risks, and
" [i]f the State has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one
the State brought upon itself.""t0
While agreeing with the Court that the announce clause was
unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy went even further, stating "content-
based speech restrictions that do not fall within any traditional excep-
tion should be invalidated without inquiry into narrow tailoring or
compelling government interests."'' Furthermore, he emphasized
that political speech is afforded the utmost protection under the First
Amendment, "and direct restrictions on the content of candidate
speech are simply beyond the power of government to impose."" 2
More importantly, however, Justice Kennedy made clear that his opin-
ion was premised on the fact that the announce clause restricted
speech ofa judicial candidate seeking office,"1 3 rather than an incum-
105 Id. at 787.
106 Id. at 781 (emphasis added) (quoting Eu v. S.F. Cnty. Democratic Cent.
Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1989).
107 Id. at 782.
108 Id. at 788 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Renne v. Geary,
501 U.S. 312, 349 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
109 Id. at 788-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110 Id. at 792.
111 Id. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 793-94 ("Minnesota may not . . . censor what the people hear as they
undertake to decide for themselves which candidate is most likely to be an exemplary
judicial officer.").
113 See id. at 796.
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bent judge seeking reelection while already sitting on the bench. He
explicitly noted that the opinion left open what limitations and
speech restrictions may be placed on judges, as employees of the
government:
This case does not present the question whether a State may restrict
the speech of judges because they are judges-for example, as part
of a code of judicial conduct; the law at issue here regulates judges
only when and because they are candidates. Whether the rationale
of Pickeing v. Board of Ed. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty.
and Connick v. Myers could be extended to allow a general speech
restriction on sitting judges-regardless of whether they are
campaigning-in order to promote the efficient administration of
justice, is not an issue raised here. 114
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg authored two separate dissenting
opinions joined by Justices Breyer and Souter. Justice Stevens claimed
that the majority had inaccurately appraised the importance of judi-
cial independence and impartiality, and had proceeded on a flawed
assumption that 'judicial candidates should have the same freedom
'to express themselves on matters of current public importance' as do
all other elected officials."' 15 Instead, Justice Stevens asserted that
" [e] lected judges . .. occupy an office of trust that is fundamentally
different from that occupied by policymaking officials,"' 16 and that it
is "the business of judges," unlike other elected officials, "to be indif-
ferent to unpopularity."" 7
Likewise, Justice Ginsburg also emphasized the fundamental dif-
ference between the role of the judiciary and that of the executive and
legislative branches." 8 Further, she expressed her belief that the con-
stitutionality of the announce clause was "amply supported" under two
main grounds.119 First, Justice Ginsburg explained that litigants have
a right to an impartial tribunal, under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and that "a litigant is deprived of due pro-
cess where the judge who hears his case has a 'direct, personal, sub-
stantial, and pecuniary' interest in ruling against him." 2 0
114 Id. at 796 (citations omitted).
115 Id. at 797 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 781-82 (majority opinion)).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 798.
118 See id. at 803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Legislative and executive officials act
on behalf of the voters who placed them in office; 'judge[s] represen[t] the Law.'")
(alterations in original) (quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 411 (1991) (Scalia,
J. dissenting)).
119 Id. at 819.
120 Id. at 815 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 824 (1986)).
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Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg noted that the announce clause serves
to eliminate any interest a judge may have in a given case, thus pro-
tecting the due process rights of litigants.121 Second, Justice Ginsburg
stated that the clause reinforces the authority of the judiciary, thereby
promoting public confidence in state judges. 122
III. LOWER COURT EXTENSIONS OF WHITE
While the Court in White addressed for the first time the constitu-
tionality of restrictions on judicial campaign speech, there were still
many issues uncharted by the opinion.12 3 First, White only considered
the constitutionality of the "announce clause." Other common provi-
sions of states' judicial canons, including prohibitions on endorsing
public officials, personally soliciting campaign funds, or making
"pledges or promises" of conduct while in office, were not addressed
by the Court,124 and still remain intact in many states. Additionally,
the decision in White pertained to an attorney that was a candidate for
judicial office. The court did not consider the constitutionality of the
clause as it would apply to an incumbent judge seeking re-election. 125
In fact, Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which was essential to the 5-4
majority, explicitly left open the possibility that greater restrictions on
incumbent judges' speech may be permissible on the premise that
judges are public employees.126
Lower courts have attempted to fill in the gaps left by White.
Some courts have read White as validating the notion that judicial elec-
121 See id. at 819.
122 See id.
123 See generally Sullivan, supra note 4, at 1330-32 (noting that the White Court left
intact state roles barring judicial candidates from making promises during judicial
campaigns; it did not address incumbentjudges running for reelection, and it did not
address speech restrictions on campaign supporters).
124 See generally Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2001) (address-
ing only the speech for candidates during campaigns). See also id. at 770 ("Minnesota
Code [also] contains a so-called "pledges or promises" clause, which separately pro-
hibits judicial candidates from making 'pledges or promises of conduct in office other
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the office,'-a prohibi-
tion that is not challenged here and on which we express no view.") (emphasis omit-
ted) (citation omitted).
125 See id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("This case does not present the ques-
tion whether a State may restrict the speech ofjudges because they are judges . . . .").
126 See id. ("Petitioner Gregory Wersal was not a sitting judge but a challenger; he
had not voluntarily entered into an employment relationship with the State or surren-
dered any First Amendment rights.); see also id. ("Whether the rationale of Pickering
... and Connick v. Myers .. . could be extended to allow a general speech restriction
on sitting judges . .. is not an issue raised here.").
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tion speech is the type of speech that is at the core of First Amend-
ment protection and have held unconstitutional similar bans
regulating the conduct of judicial candidates under a strict scrutiny
analysis. Other courts have taken a more restrictive approach,
allowing for prohibitions on certain types of judicial speech when it
deems that the compelling state interest of maintaining an impartial
judiciary outweighs the judicial candidates right to free speech under
a balancing test analysis. This section will examine lower courts'
expansion of White, and the circuit split that has emerged regarding
two specific and widely adopted judicial canons: the party endorse-
ment clause1 27 and the personal solicitation clause.12 8
A. Strict Scrutiny: Eighth Circuit & Sixth Circuit Opinions
1. Wersal v. Sexton129
In Wersal v. Sexton, the Eighth Circuit addressed the constitutionality
of Minnesota's endorsement and personal solicitation clauses.13 0 The
case involved Gregory Wersal, the same petitioner who challenged
Minnesota's "announce clause" in White. After successfully challeng-
ing that clause, Wersal, among others, challenged the "partisan activi-
127 While states have adopted different language to reflect the party endorsement
clause, the clause in each state more or less prohibits judges and judicial candidates
from publicly endorsing or speaking on behalf of another candidate for public office.
See, e.g., 52 MINN. STAT. ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4.1 (A) (3) (2009);
Wis. SUP. CT. R. 60.06(2)(b)(4) (1979).
128 Like the party endorsement clause, the specific language of the personal solici-
tation clause differs among states. Nonetheless, the clause generally stands for
prohibiting judges and judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contri-
butions. See, e.g., RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF KENTUCKY 4.300, Canon 5B(2);
ALA. CANONS OF JUD. ETHICS, Canon 7B(4) (A); ILL. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
7B(2); PA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7(B) (2); W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT,
Canon 5C(2); MICH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7B(2)(a); OHIO CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT, Rule 4.4(A); ARK. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A) (8); IDAHO
CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5C(2); MISS. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5C(2);
OR. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, JR 4-102(D); WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon
7B(2); AASKA CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5C(3); ARIz. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT,
Canon 4, Rule 4.1(A)(6); FLA. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7(C)(1); OKLA. CODE
OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5C(2); TENN. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5C(2)(a);
UTAH CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 4, Rule 4.2(B) (2); Wyo. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT,
Canon 4, Rules 4.2(B)(4)-(5); S.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5(B)(1); N.Y. CODE
OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5A(5); R.I. CODE OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5B(1); VT. CODE
OFJUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5B(4)(d).
129 613 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010).
130 The court also addressed the constitutionality of Minnesota's clause concern-
ing "solicitation for a personal organization or candidate." Id. at 826. However, the
validity of this clause is outside the scope of this Note.
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ties" and "solicitation" clause of Canon 5 in White JJ.131 The Eighth
Circuit found these clauses to also be a violation of the First Amend-
ment, removing the "partisan activities" clause completely from the
Code, and amending the solicitation clause to fall within the confines
of the First Amendment. 13 2 In Wersal, the petitioner alleged that the
amended solicitation clause in Minnesota's Judicial Code was still
unconstitutional, and that the endorsement clause also infringed on
his rights afforded by the First Amendment.1 3 3
The court began its opinion by noting that political speech is at
the core of the First Amendment, and that any laws burdening such
speech are permitted only if they survive strict scrutiny.1 34 Thus,
because the endorsement and personal solicitation clauses contained
in Minnesota's Judicial Code both "directly limit judicial candidates'
political speech," the court concluded that they were constitutionally
valid only if they served a compelling state interest, and were narrowly
tailored to do so.' 3 5
With respect to the endorsement clause, the court noted that it
served a compelling state interest in promoting impartiality of the
judiciary.13 6 Further, the court acknowledged that the endorsement
clause was more narrowly tailored than the announce clause in Mite,
because it "aimed at restricting speech for or against particular par-
ties," rather than particular issues.13 7
Nonetheless, the court found that the clause was still not tailored
enough to meet the exacting standard of strict scrutiny. 3 8 Although
endorsements advocate support for a particular party, and therefore
may cause concern for bias, the court noted endorsements can also be
used as a proxy for a candidate to express his or her own views on "a
myriad of matters."139 Accordingly, the court found that the clause
was overinclusive and regulated more speech than necessary.140 The
court also found the endorsement clause to be underinclusive.14 1
Specifically, it found that the clause prevented judicial candidates
from endorsing other candidates for public office, but it did not pre-
131 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, White II, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005).
132 See id. at 766.
133 See Wersal, 613 F.3d at 826.
134 See id. at 829.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 833.
137 Id. at 835.
138 See id.
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 Id. at 836.
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vent them from endorsing parties who had not officially filed for
office, or public officials who were already elected, "no matter the
likelihood of their becoming litigants in a case before the court."' 4 2
Finally, the court noted that recusal by the judge, rather than a cate-
gorical ban on endorsements, "is the least restrictive means of accom-
plishing [a] state's interest in impartiality."143
Like the endorsement clause, the court held the personal solicita-
tion clause was also unconstitutional. Although the court found that
preventing candidates from soliciting money from potential litigants
addressed a compelling state interest of maintaining "impartiality as to
parties to a particular case," the clause was not narrowly tailored to do
so. 14 4 The court reasoned that the real risk for impartiality is not from
"the fundraising itself, but rather from a judicial candidate being able
to trace contributions back to individual donors." 14 5 However, the
court noted Minnesota had already adopted a less restrictive alterna-
tive to address this concern by requiring candidates to refrain from
obtaining information "identifying those who contribute or refuse to
contribute to the candidate's campaign." 146 Further, the court noted,
as it did with the endorsement clause, that recusal will prevent any
harm of apparent impartiality and serves to protect both a litigant's
due process rights in having an unbiased proceeding and a candi-
date's right to free speech.14 7
2. Carey v. Wolnitzek14 8
In Carey v. Wolnitzek, the court used strict scrutiny to invalidate a
series of clauses contained in Kentucky's Code of Judicial Conduct,
including a provision prohibiting judicial candidates from personally
soliciting campaign contributions. 149 In determining the standard for
review, the court concluded strict scrutiny was appropriate for prima-
rily two reasons.15 0 First, the court noted that the Supreme Court's
entire analysis in White was premised on the applicability of strict scru-
tiny, and none of the Justices, including the four dissenters, objected
142 Id.
143 Id. (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, White II, 416 F.3d 738, 755
(8th Cir. 2005)).
144 Id. at 839 (quoting White II, 416 F.3d at 765).
145 Id. at 840 (citing White II, 416 F.3d at 765).
146 Id. (quoting 52 MINN. STAT. ANN., CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon
4.2 (A) (5)).
147 Id. at 841.
148 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010).
149 See id. at 194-95.
150 See id. at 198-99.
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to it.151 Second, the court stated that the clauses at issue here all cen-
sored speech based on its content, and that except for the traditional
categorical carve-outs, content-based speech restrictions face strict
scrutiny. 152 The court explained that reviewing the clauses under the
lesser balancing test was inappropriate, because the speech restric-
tions here were aimed
not at judges performing court functions but at judges and judicial
candidates making campaign statements or solicitations outside of
court and outside of the process of deciding cases in their official
capacity-all for the purpose of communicating information to vot-
ers about whom they should elect.'
To further support its position, the court cited a number of cases
from other circuits that relied on strict scrutiny to assess the constitu-
tionality ofjudicial campaign speech restrictions after Mite, including
Weaver v. Bonner,154 where the Eleventh Circuit used strict scrutiny to
invalidate Georgia's personal solicitation clause.' 55
With respect to the personal solicitation clause in particular, the
court stated that it censored content-based speech by "prevent[ing]
candidates from asking for support in some ways (campaign funds)
but not others (a vote, yard signs). "156 However, the court found that
the solicitation clause met the first prong of strict scrutiny, as it served
Kentucky's compelling interest in maintaining the actual and appar-
ent impartiality of its judiciary.' 5 7 Because the general public often is
less interested in judicial elections than other elections, the court rea-
soned that judges must focus their campaign efforts on those "most
likely to have an interest in judicial races: the bar." 5 8 This leads to a
situation where "judges preside over cases in which the parties are rep-
resented by counsel who have contributed . . . [to their] judicial
campaigns."159
Despite these considerations, the court held that the personal
solicitation clause failed the second prong of strict scrutiny. First, the
clause was overinclusive.o60 It prohibited candidates from engaging in
151 Id. at 198.
152 Id. at 198-99.
153 Id. at 200.
154 309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
155 See Carey, 614 F.3d 189, 199 (6th Cir. 2010).
156 Id.
157 See id. at 204.
158 Id.
159 Id. (quoting Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Penn., 944 F.2d
137, 145 (3d Cir. 1991).
160 Id. at 205.
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conduct such as making speeches to large groups and sending mass
mailings, both of which "present little or no risk of undue pressure or
the appearance of a quid pro quo."161 Additionally, the prohibition
was unfavorably biased towards certain candidates: "incumbent judges
(who benefit from their current status) over non-judicial candidates,
the well-to-do (who may not need to raise any money at all) over
lower-income candidates, and the well-connected (who have an army
of potential fundraisers) over outsiders." 1 6 2 Accordingly the Sixth Cir-
cuit held the personal solicitation clause violated the First Amend-
ment, and struck down the clause, despite the plaintiffs assertion that
similar provisions had been widely adopted by other states engaging
in judicial elections. 163
B. The Balancing Test: Seventh Circuit Opinions
In contrast to the Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit has
mistakenly held that certain judicial speech restraints, including bans
on endorsements and personal solicitations, should be reviewed
under the balancing test rather than strict scrutiny. In Siefert v. Alexan-
der,164 an incumbent judge challenged the constitutionality of the
party membership, party endorsement, and personal solicitation
clauses contained in Wisconsin's Code of Judicial Conduct. 65 Inter-
estingly, while the Seventh Circuit concluded that the appropriate
standard of review for the party membership clause was strict scrutiny,
it simultaneously held that the party endorsement and personal solici-
tation clauses should be reviewed under the less rigorous balancing
test.166
Wisconsin's party membership clause16 7 proscribed that "[n]o
judge or candidate for judicial office or judge-elect may . .. [b]e a
member of any political party."168 Because the canon was a content-
based speech restriction, preventing judicial candidates from speaking
on their political views and their qualifications for office, the court
161 Id.
162 Id. at 204.
163 See id. at 206.
164 608 F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010).
165 See id. at 979.
166 See id. at 981-91.
167 See id at 981. Although this Note focuses on the circuit split that has emerged
with respect to the party endorsement and personal solicitation clauses, it is necessary
to review the Seventh Circuit's analysis regarding the party membership clause
because it illustrates the court's reasoning for reviewing certain provisions under strict
scrutiny and other provisions under the balancing test.
168 See id. (quoting Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 60.06(2) (b) (1)).
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concluded that it was subject to strict scrutiny.1 6 9 To further support
its position, the court noted that the party membership clause fell
"squarely within the ambit of the Supreme Court's analysis in White
I,"170 because, similar to White, the ban prevented "speech that is 'at
the core of our First Amendment freedoms'-speech about the quali-
fications of candidates for public office."171 Ultimately, the court held
that the clause was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tai-
lored to meet the compelling state interest of preventing judicial bias
for or against parties and because recusal was a less restrictive alterna-
tive to censoring the speech.172
Wisconsin's party endorsement clause prohibited 'judges and
judicial candidates from '[p]ublicly endors[ing] or speaking on
behalf' of any partisan candidate or platform."17 3 Although this
clause, like the party membership clause, targeted campaign speech
made during judicial elections, the Seventh Circuit oddly, and unper-
suasively, distinguished the two canons. 17 4 Specifically, the court
stated that "'[e] ndorsements primarily benefit the endorsee not the
endorser' and may be exchanged between political actors on a quid
pro quo basis. ... [O]ffering an endorsement is less ajudge's commu-
nication about his qualifications and beliefs than an effort to affect a
separate political campaign."17 5 Further, the court declared there was
"a dividing line between the party [membership] rule, which imper-
missibly bars protected speech about the judge's own campaign, and
the public endorsement rule, which addresses ajudge's entry into the
political arena on behalf of his partisan comrades."' 7 6 Based on this
unsound distinction, the court concluded that a more deferential
approach should be afforded to the state, and that the party endorse-
169 Id. at 981.
170 Id.
171 Id. (quoting Republican Party of Minn. v. White, White I, 536 U.S. 765, 774
(2002)).
172 See id. at 982-83.
173 See id. at 983 (quoting Wis. Sup. Ct. R. 60.06(2) (b) (4)).
174 See id. at 983 ("An endorsement is a different form of speech that serves a
purpose distinct from the speech at issue in White land in the party identification rule
. . . ."); see also id. at 984 ("[A] public endorsement is not the same type of campaign
speech targeted by the impermissible rule against party affiliation in this case or the
impermissible rule against talking about legal issues the Supreme Court struck down
in White I.").
175 Id. at 984 (quoting Brief for Appellee at 378 n.11, Siefert v. Alexander, 608
F.3d 974 (7th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-1713) (internal citation omitted)).
176 Id.
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ment clause was subject to review under the balancing test, rather
than strict scrutiny.177
Relying on Pickering, the court noted that its task was to weigh the
state's interest in regulating the speech against the employee's inter-
est in speaking.178 The court identified that the state had an interest
in the ban for several reasons.' 79 First, a judge who endorses a party
may later preside over the party in court, which increases the risk of
bias.180 Additionally, the court stated that there are quid pro quo con-
cerns with endorsements, and that "judicial candidates and judges-
elect could elicit promises from elected officials, including local pros-
ecutors and attorneys general, in exchange for their endorsement."' 8
Finally, the court stated that Wisconsin has an interest in preventing
its judges from "being at the fulcrum of local party politics."18 2 In
contrast to its analysis of the party membership clause, the court
rejected the notion that recusal could be a less-restrictive alternative
to bans on endorsements.1 8 3 Instead the court noted that recusal
would be impracticable because certain parties that may gain endorse-
ment, such as prosecutors and sheriffs, are involved in litigation on a
daily basis.184 Therefore, in the court's view, because the "endorse-
ment restriction d[id] not infringe on a judge's ability to inform the
electorate of his qualifications and beliefs," the balance was struck in
favor of the state, making the regulation permissible. 85
The court also held that Wisconsin's personal solicitation clause
was subject to review under a less exacting standard than strict scru-
tiny.186 To support this position, the court incorrectly relied on the
Supreme Court case of Buckley v. Valeo.187 In Buckley, the Court held
that restrictions on fundraising are less burdensome to speech rights
than restrictions on spending, and therefore are reviewed under an
intermediate scrutiny standard. 18 The Seventh Circuit misapplied
this standard to the personal solicitation clause and held that because
the clause did not impede "the amount or manner in which a candi-
date can spend money on his campaign," the appropriate level of
177 Id. at 983.
178 Id. at 985 (citing Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 536, 568 (1968)).
179 See id. at 986.
180 See id.
181 Id. (quoting Brief of Conf. of Chief Justices, amicus, at 23).
182 Id.
183 Id. at 986-88.
184 See id. at 986-87.
185 Id. at 987-88.
186 Id. at 988.
187 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
188 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25.
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review was the lesser standard of "closely drawn scrutiny."189 Under
this lower standard, the Seventh Circuit held that the personal solicita-
tion ban was "drawn closely enough to the state's interest in preserv-
ing impartiality and preventing corruption to be constitutional."' 90
The court conceded that the solicitation clause was overinclusive, and
would prohibit some solicitations that would pose no risk to judicial
bias, but nonetheless declared that this was not fatal to the constitu-
tionality of the ban.191
Although the court in Siefert explicitly stated that its analysis was
dependent on the fact that the challenger was an incumbent judge,
and refused to comment on whether the regulations would be valid
for ajudicial candidate who was not yet ajudge, 9 2 the Seventh Circuit
addressed this issue in Bauer v. Shepard.s93 In Bauer, plaintiffs Torrey
Bauer, a candidate for judicial office, and David Certo, a sitting judge,
brought suit alleging that various provisions of the Indiana Code of
Judicial Conduct were unconstitutional. 94 In determining the consti-
tutionality of certain provisions the court affirmed that the analysis of
Siefert applied,195 thus suggesting that Siefert extends to challenges
made both by judicial candidates and incumbent judges.
The court noted that under Siefert, electoral activity made on
behalf of third parties (such as endorsements of partisan candidates in
Siefert and making speeches on behalf of political organizations in
Bauer) are governed by First Amendment principles regarding public
employees, and therefore are subject to the balancing test rather than
strict scrutiny. 196 The court also affirmed that a lower level of scrutiny
applied to personal solicitation bans.'97 While the court acknowl-
edged that their balancing approach was in conflict with both the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits, the court commented that they remained
unconvinced by the approaches taken by those courts. Specifically
with respect to the Eighth Circuit decision the Bauer court stated:
Although Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010),
recently held that Minnesota's equivalents of Rule 4.1 (A) (3) (the
189 See Siefert, 608 F.3d at 988.
190 Id. at 990.
191 See id.
192 See id. at 988 ("Our treatment of the endorsement prohibition is based on the
claims that Judge Siefert, an incumbent, brings. This is not the appropriate case to
address the issues of regulations for judicial candidates who are not judges.").
193 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010).
194 See id. at 707.
195 See id. at 711.
196 See id.
197 See id. at 706.
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no-endorsement rule) and Rule 4.1 (A) (4) and (8) (the solicitation
limits) violate the first amendment, it did not discuss (or even cite)
Pickering, Letter Carriers, or any of the Supreme Court's other deci-
sions concerning restrictions on public employees' political activi-
ties. The majority in Wersal concluded that the court's en banc
decision in White II requires the application of strict scrutiny to all
ethical rules that affect either judicial campaigns or judges' partici-
pation in campaigns for other offices. We are unpersuaded and
shall stick with Siefert's analysis, which differentiates what judges can
do in their own campaigns (the subject of White 1) from how judges
can participate in other persons' campaigns (the subject of Letter
Carriers and similar decisions).' 9 8
Due to these differing standards, many of the states in the Seventh
Circuit have held intact provisions prohibiting judges and judicial can-
didates from endorsing public officials and soliciting campaign contri-
butions,199 while states in the Sixth2 00 and Eighth2 0 Circuits have
removed these bans.
IV. ANALYsis: DETERMINING THE CORRECT STANDARD OF REVIEW
As it currently stands, a circuit split has emerged regarding the
appropriate level of review for restraints on judicial campaign speech.
On one side, the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have applied strict scrutiny,
which permits regulation ofjudicial candidates' speech only if the law
is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Under this stan-
dard of review, those circuits have deemed unconstitutional restric-
tions prohibiting judicial candidates from endorsing public officials or
from personally soliciting campaign contributions. On the other side,
the Seventh Circuit has adopted the more lenient "balancing test,"
weighing the state interests in regulating the speech against the candi-
date's interest in speaking. Using this approach, the Seventh Circuit
has upheld similar restrictions on public endorsements and personal
solicitations, finding that the balance is in favor of the States in main-
taining the actual and apparent impartiality of their judiciaries.
By examining the principles of the First Amendment as well as
practical considerations, it is apparent that judicial speech restraints
198 See id. at 713 (emphasis added).
199 See, e.g., Winnig v. Seller, 731 F. Supp. 2d 855 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (ruling that the
prohibitions applied to the candidate for a judicial position).
200 See, e.g., Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189 (6th Cir. 2010) (determining that the
party affiliation and solicitation clauses violated free speech).
201 See, e.g., Wersal v. Sexton, 613 F.3d 821 (8th Cir. 2010) (ruling that the clauses
in Minnesota's Judicial Code of Conduct prohibiting judges from endorsing other
candidates or soliciting votes violated their First Amendment rights).
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should be reviewed under strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the Seventh
Circuit's application of the balancing test is inappropriate in the con-
text of judicial elections.
A. Seventh Circuit Opinion: Logical Shortcomings
Not only is the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Siefert contrary to First
Amendment jurisprudence, the opinion itself is logically inconsistent.
To begin, the Court in Siefert draws a distinction between the party
membership clause, which it reviewed under strict scrutiny, and the
endorsement clause, which it reviewed under the balancing test.2 0 2
To distinguish the two, the court commented that the speech at issue
for each respective clause served fundamentally different purposes. 2 03
Specifically the court stated that when a judicial candidate affiliates
with a party he is thereby expressing his own views and qualifications,
but when endorsing a public official he is not.2 0 4 Proceeding on this
faulty premise, the court held that the party membership clause
should be held to higher scrutiny because it regulated content based
speech about a candidate's own campaign, while the endorsement
clause did not.205
This argument, however, is illogical. When a judicial candidate
endorses a public official, it is likely that his views are aligned with the
endorsee's. Thus, by supporting a public official, the judicial candi-
date has the opportunity to announce his views on a number of mat-
ters. In fact, endorsements are generally used in a host of situations to
do just that. For example, political parties endorse candidates to com-
municate to the public that the candidate holds certain views on
issues. Additionally, there is no more threat to impartiality when a
judge associates with a candidate and endorses him than when ajudge
associates with a party. 206 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit's argument
distinguishing between the purpose and speech at issue with respect
to the party membership clause and endorsement clause is inconsis-
tent. Both clauses burden the same type of speech and should be
held to the same standard.
202 See Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 981-88 (7th Cir. 2010).
203 See id. at 983.
204 See id.
205 See id. at 984.
206 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Siefert v. Alexander, 20-21 (No. 10-
405).
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B. Strict Scrutiny Is the Appropriate Standard Under First
Amendment Principles
Aside from preliminary matters regarding the inconsistencies within
the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Siefert, the court makes an even
greater error in applying the balancing test to the context of restric-
tions on judicial campaign speech.
There is little debate that political speech is at the core of our
First Amendment freedoms.207 The Supreme Court has declared that
the First Amendment has its "fullest and most urgent application pre-
cisely to the conduct of campaigns,"208 and that discussion and debate
about candidates' qualifications is vital to operation of government.209
Further, the Court has adamantly stated that it has "never allowed the
government to prohibit candidates from communicating relevant
information to voters during an election."210 Restrictions on political
speech have been held to the most exacting scrutiny. Accordingly,
content-based restrictions on judicial candidates' speech must also be
subject to strict scrutiny. With respect to the endorsement and per-
sonal solicitation clauses adopted by many states, it is clear that both
of these bans regulate speech based on their content; they prevent
candidates from speaking about certain subjects (endorsements) but
not others, and "they prevent candidates from asking for support in
some ways (campaign funds) but not others (a vote, yard signs)."211
Consequently, these prohibitions should be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.
The Seventh Circuit relies on Pickering and Letter Carriers to illus-
trate that the Supreme Court has invoked a lesser standard of scrutiny
for regulations of speech made by government employees, balancing
the employee's right to speak on matters of public concern against the
government's need for efficient operation of government func-
tions.212 Specifically with respect to Letter Carriers, the court com-
mented that under a more deferential standard of review, the
Supreme Court found the Hatch Act, which prohibited federal
employees from participating in certain political activities, including
207 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, White I, 536 U.S. 765, 774 (2002); see
also Erwin Chemerinsky, Restrictions on the Speech of Judicial Candidates Are Unconstitu-
tional, 35 IND. L. REv. 735, 741 (2002) ("[P]olitical speech has long been regarded
[as] at the very core of the First Amendment.").
208 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971).
209 See Buckley v. Valeo, 421 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (per curiam).
210 White 1, 536 U.S. at 782.
211 Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d 189, 199 (6th Cir. 2010).
212 See Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 536, 568 (1968).
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political campaigns, constitutional. 213 However, the Seventh Circuit
fails to recognize that neither of these cases, nor any of the other gov-
ernment employee speech cases, has ever been applied to elected offi-
cials. 214 To the contrary, "[t]he Supreme Court has long found the
speech of elected officials to be as protected as that of ordinary citi-
zens."215 Further, the purpose of allowing the state to regulate public
employee speech was to enable the employer, the government, to
operate efficiently. However, in the case of elected judges, while the
government is technically the employer, the judge ultimately is
accountable to the people. Accordingly, the employee speech cases
are not analogous to the situation presented.
Further, with respect to the solicitation clause in particular, the
court concluded that under Buckley v. Valeo, restrictions on candidate
contributions are subject to lesser scrutiny than restrictions on candi-
date spending.216 Accordingly, the court held that the personal solici-
tation clause would be reviewed under the lesser standard of "closely
drawn scrutiny," rather than under strict scrutiny, because the ban did
"not restrict the amount or manner in which a judicial candidate can
spend money on his or her campaign. "217 However, the court
commits error in its analysis of Buckley, and the other Supreme Court
cases in its line. The Supreme Court cases, which have drawn a dis-
tinction between candidate contributions and candidate spending,
discussed specific limits on campaign contributions. They did not dis-
cuss whether the contribution could be made at all.218 In fact, the
Court in Buckley noted that a limitation on the amount a candidate
may contribute "involves little direct restraint on his political commu-
nication, for it permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced
by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues." 219 In the present case,
however, personally solicited contributions in any amount are not per-
mitted. Thus, this situation differs greatly from that in Buckley. Here,
the personal solicitation ban does not limit contributions; rather it
213 See Siefert v. Alexander, 608 F.3d 974, 980 (7th Cir. 2010).
214 See id. at 991 (Rovner,J., dissenting); see generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
Siefert v. Alexander, at 11 (No. 10405) ("None of these cases have ever stood for the
proposition that elected officials' speech, including judicial candidates' speech, could
likewise be restricted.").
215 Siefert, 608 F.3d at 991 (Rovner, J., dissenting).
216 See id. at 988 (majority opinion).
217 Id.
218 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Siefert v. Alexander, at 8 (No. 10405)
(explaining that in Buckley, the "closely drawn" scrutiny test was applied to campaign
contribution limits).
219 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam).
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restricts speech based on its content.220 As content-based speech reg-
ulations have always been reviewed under strict scrutiny, it is clear that
the personal solicitation ban should follow this precedent.
C. Policy Considerations Favor Strict Scrutiny
As discussed, the First Amendment has its fullest application in the
context of political campaigns, and political speech has always been
subject to strict scrutiny.221 Admittedly, the role ofjudges differs from
that of other elected officials in many important aspects. In the most
general sense, legislators and executive officials represent their con-
stituents and strive to advance their constituents' interests. Judges, on
the other hand, "do not sit as representatives of particular persons,
communities, or parties . . . ."222 Rather, they are interpreters of the
law. Nonetheless, states have voluntarily chosen to select their judges
through elections and must abide by the processes that accompany it.
Voters in judicial elections, like all other elections, must choose their
candidates based on a host of reasons including the candidate's quali-
fications, views, experience, past performance, and suitability for the
role.22 3 Accordingly, candidates must be allowed to convey all rele-
vant information to voters, so that voters can to make an informed
decision. The Seventh Circuit argues that states have an interest in
maintaining the impartiality of the judiciary that outweighs a candi-
date's right to speech. This argument is unpersuasive. Of course
there are dangers in judicial campaigning, but these dangers are the
product of having elected, rather than appointed, judges. To apply a
different standard of review, as the Seventh Circuit does, to ameliorate
these dangers is a form of judicial legislation that contorts First
Amendment jurisprudence in the process. States with elected judges
have made a choice and courts overstep their boundaries when they
substitute their own judgment for the legislatures'.
Further, the Seventh Circuit does not need to "dilute the First
Amendment"224 in order to effectuate states' interest in preserving the
impartiality of the judiciary. Instead of applying an inappropriate
standard, the court can very well give deference to this interest under
a strict scrutiny analysis itself. In fact, strict scrutiny assumes that a
220 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Siefert v. Alexander, (No. 10-405) (list-
ing examples of courts striking down content-based speech restrictions and sug-
gesting this case is analogous).
221 See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
222 See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 806 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
223 See id. at 807-09.
224 Carey v. Wolnitzek, 614 F.3d. 189, 200 (6th Cir. 2010).
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state will have a compelling interest in regulating the speech-and
will allow that speech to be regulated-so long as the restriction is
narrowly tailored. It is illogical to resort to a different standard when
strict scrutiny can provide the appropriate safeguard.
Finally, many states have adopted these judicial canons as a
means to ensure the impartiality of their judiciaries. This Note does
not dispute the significance of that interest. On the contrary, it is
undeniable that due process requires that litigants be afforded the
right to be heard by an impartial tribunal.225 However, regulating the
speech ofjudicial candidates is not an effective way to accomplish this
goal.2 26 Restricting judges from speaking about their interests does
not preventjudges from having these interests. Similarly, it is unlikely
that a judge's expressing of his views makes him "less impartial or
more likely to decide the case in a particular direction." 227 Rather,
exposing citizens to judicial candidates' views and interests during the
election process provides for greater transparency in the process over-
all, and increases the likelihood for recusal when appropriate. Thus,
only when a judicial speech regulation survives the utmost scrutiny
shall it be enforced.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit has inappropriately applied the balancing test
to a realm of speech that calls for strict scrutiny. In doing so, it has
effectuated a split among the Circuits regarding the appropriate level
of scrutiny to afford judicial campaign speech. Like other forms of
political speech, judicial campaign speech must be afforded the
utmost protection under the First Amendment. Any attempts to
restrict judicial candidates' speech must fail unless the prohibition
survives the exacting standard of strict scrutiny. Although many states
have long adopted judicial elections as a means of selecting their judi-
ciary, they cannot turn a blind eye to the dangers that are a product of
this decision. Judicial elections inherently turn candidates into politi-
cians. If states are uncomfortable with this result, the appropriate
remedy is to amend their selection process. However, while states
continue to choose their judiciary through elections, they must afford
225 See White I, 536 U.S. at 815 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
226 See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 206 (asserting that if we are to allow
judges to be elected, we must allow them to engage in political speech, so the voters
are able to make an informed choice).
227 Id. at 745. "Antonin Scalia would vote to overrule Roe v. Wade whether he
expressed this in his confirmation hearings or not." Id. at 744.
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their judicial candidates the same protections that are afforded to all
other elected officials. Anything less is a violation of the First
Amendment.
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